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This paper is an overt essay in persuasion. We attempt to persuade readers of the 
inefficient and systematic bias in the allocation of developmental resources over the 
last three decades, with the bias going against the agriculture sector. The bias is 
inefficient because no currently advanced country of substantial size became 
advanced without the agriculture sector first achieving substantial productivity gains 
in the early stages of development. The bias is systematic because it has fundamental 
institutional causes grounded in both the political economy of developing economies 
and in theoretical views held within the premier institutions of the development 
profession. In this paper we will make the case for the inefficiency of the bias, explore 
the systematic institutional causes of the bias, and strongly argue for its correction.  
2.  Agriculture, Growth and Poverty Reduction 
Economic development typically entails a structural transformation in the composition 
of production in tandem with increased urbanization. This has seldom proceeded 
without substantial gains in the agricultural sector at early stages of development. 
Many authors have shown that a Green Revolution occurred before or 
contemporaneously to the Industrial Revolution (Rostow, 1960; Crafts, 1985a; Allen, 
1994; Overton, 1996),
2 while Adelman and Morris (1988) also present evidence that it 
was the strong agricultural performers in the 19
th Century that subsequently developed 
most rapidly. Adelman and Morris (1967), in their cross-country study of the 
                                                   
1 Note that on occasion we make reference to the full version of this paper – Bezemer and Headey 
(2006) - which is available as a CEPA working paper. Also, this paper has benefited from extensive 
discussions with Andrew Dorward, Tim Foy and Rachel Slater, but the authors are responsible for all 
opinions and any errors. 
2 While this claim has recently been disputed by Clark (1999), he also presents evidence that the 
Western countries – especially the industrial leader, Great Britain, had achieved comparatively high 
levels of agricultural productivity before the onset of the Industrial Revolution. Maddison (2001) 
provides similar evidence that the Western countries were already considerably wealthier than the rest 
of the world in 1800.   3 
interdependent socioeconomic determinants of growth in contemporary developing 
economies, found that agricultural transformation was important both in the manner 
predicted by Lewis (1954)  and in terms of breaking down the traditional social 
elements of the agricultural sector.
3 Seminal work by Ranis and Fei (1964), Johnston 
and Mellor (1961), Adelman and Morris (1967) and Little et al. (1970), as well as 
follow-up research,  has also strongly confirmed the stylized fact that agricultural 
development precedes and feeds industrialization (see Timmer (1997, 2002) for a 
taxonomy of the linkages between agriculture and the greater economy). Krueger et 
al. (1991) and Stern (1996) have argued that successful industrializers (including the 
East Asian ‘miracles’) had only modest discrimination against the agricultural sector 
(which also decreased over time) and high levels of productivity growth, whereas 
unsuccessful industrializers often heavily discriminated against the agricultural sector 
through trade and pricing policies, and had agricultural growth ranging from modest 
to very poor indeed. Bezemer and Headey (2006) expand on previous research by 
analysing the role of agricultural development in creating sustained aggregate growth 
accelerations in developing countries in the past 40 years, and conclude that 
agricultural development is necessary (but not sufficient) for successful ‘take-off’. 
The growth of agricultural output and agricultural wages is also the most 
effective means of reducing poverty in the poorest countries. The 2001 World 
Development report estimated that 1.2 billion people world wide live below a PPP $1 
per day poverty line. The proportion of these people that are rural is estimated to 
range from 62% (CGIAR) to 75% (IFAD) - that is, there are about 744 to 900 million 
rural poor worldwide – so agricultural-led growth immediately influences the incomes 
of the majority of the poor. But it also empowers an often under-empowered group 
                                                   
3The monetization of the agricultural sector, especially, serves an institutional purpose as well as an   4 
(which may reduce future urban biases) and has stronger indirect effects on urban 
poverty via the reduction in food prices (conditional upon the tradability of food) and 
the reduction of ‘push-urbanization’ and its consequent urban unemployment. Thus in 
countries where the majority of the poor are rural, poverty reduction strategies  in 
which agricultural productivity growth is the penultimate goal are always safer and 
sounder than industry-led strategies, a claim confirmed by numerous empirical studies 
of the last 40 years of development experience (Gallup et al. 1997; Thirtle et al. 2003; 
Datt and Ravallion, 1996; De Janvry and Saddoulet, 1996; Timmer, 1997, 2002; 
Bourgignon and Morrison, 1998; Warr, 2000; Ravallion and Chen, 2004; Byerlee et 
al., 2005).  
3.  Agricultural Development and the Public Sector 
Growth and poverty reduction via agricultural growth requires active and 
long-term involvement by the public sector in shaping and facilitating sector-specific 
technological innovation and market development, in conjunction with the general 
role of developmental states in providing public goods and in co-ordinating market 
processes (e.g. Stigltz, 1998). Market failures which are often particular to the 
underdeveloped rural sector necessitate government intervention of various forms. 
Incomplete or missing markets due to information asymmetry, high transaction costs, 
labor market distortions, extreme volatility and covariance of incomes (resulting in 
missing agricultural insurance markets), and the indivisibility of many rural 
investments (Binswanger and Deininger, 1997) all imply that governments are 
justified in executing Second Best (e.g. in the provision of rural finance) or even 
Third Best policies (e.g. in the direct provision of capital if financial intervention 
fails). 
                                                                                                                                                  
economic one.   5 
Empirical evidence strongly supports Second Best reasoning. DFID (2005a) 
notes that a common characteristic of successful Green Revolution adopters was the 
primacy awarded to agriculture in national development efforts.  In Bezemer and 
Headey (2006) we also confirm these views with a novel analysis of data on central 
government resource allocation to the agricultural sector. Successful Green 
Revolution (GR) countries poured significant resources into agriculture (Mexico, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, China, Korea, with Middle Eastern and North African 
countries arguably constituting a second group) while low-spending GR countries 
floundered (India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh, Colombia). We  conclude  that 
resource accumulation matters as much as, or even more than, technology driven 
growth in the agricultural sector, and is probably best described as a necessary 
complementary input to technological factors. Research by Murgai (2001), Mosley 
(2002)  and  Dorward et al. (2003, 2004, 2006) similarly  note  the  institutional 
bottlenecks constraining agricultural development in Africa and South Asia. 
But despite these solid theoretical grounds for government intervention in the 
sector, agriculture has received a disproportionately small allocation of public 
resources,  including foreign aid, over the last three decades. Agricultural aid  has 
declined as a proportion of total aid, especially in the 1990s (World Food Summit, 
1996;  World Bank, 2003; DFID, 2005b) and DFID (2005b) even show  that the 
absolute  global volume of assistance to agriculture (expressed in 2002 prices) 
decreased by nearly two-thirds from US$ 6.2 billion to US$ 2.3 billion between 1980 
and 2002, with most of this decrease occurred during the 1990s. In Figure 1 we show 
that  real  agricultural aid has declined since 1985 even when agricultural aid is 
weighted by ‘need’; that is, but the size of rural populations. Thus, agricultural aid per 
rural inhabitant has markedly declined in the last 20 years.    6 
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4.  Understanding the Paradox: Urban Biases 
So far, we have posed what might be termed an Agricultural Paradox in development: 
publicly financed agricultural investments are of large and continuing developmental 
importance for growth and poverty reduction, yet development resources devoted to 
such investments have generally been small and have largely been decreasing in 
recent years. In this section we attempt to offer the first of our two explanations, long-
standing political economy factors which fall under the broad umbrella of “urban 
biases”. 
Economists have been aware of urban biases since Myrdal’s Economic Theory 
and Underdeveloped Regions (1958), and quite especially since the work of Michael 
Lipton (1977), who popularized the term and claimed that the insufficient allocation 
of resources to the rural sector was the primary obstacle to greater poverty alleviation. 
However, the deeper impediment to a more efficient allocation of resource is 
institutional in nature, for urban biases are deemed to evolve endogenously out of   7 
social and political factors, including the lower costs and greater effectiveness of 
urban political mobilization (Lipton, 1977; Lal and Myint, 1996; Bates, 1988; 
Binswanger and Dieninger, 1997), the small short-run supply elasticity of agriculture 
which allows short-sighted politicians to tax the sector at a seemingly low expense 
(Johnston and Mellor, 1961), race and caste differences between the elite and the rural 
poor, and attitudes derived from colonial institutions which often favoured urban 
elites and fostered elitist attitudes towards the working masses (Myrdal, 1958; see also 
Binswanger and Deininger, 1997). 
In empirical terms, explanations of urban biases have been difficult beasts to 
capture, even though biases in government expenditure, foreign aid and trade regimes 
have long been documented. In the tables below we a use a simple measure of urban 
infrastructure bias, the percentage of the urban population with access to safe water 
less the equivalent rural percentage circa 2000, based on data from WDI (2004). Table 
1 documents these urban-rural infrastructure differences for a wide range of countries. 
We leave the reader to peruse individual scores, but we do ask the reader to note that 
the difference between urban and rural safe water infrastructure is remarkably large 
on average (with a mean of 27 percentage points) which is consistent with our 
findings on foreign aid allocations, but also highly dispersed (a standard deviation of 
14 percentage points). In Table 2 we test whether the institutional explanations of 
urban biases noted above are validated by the data. The table shows that urban biases 
are significantly explained by (expected signs in parenthesis): initial labour 
productivity (-), land inequality (+), land area (which proxies for the political isolation 
of rural pressure groups) (+), the strength of democratic institutions (-), and a sub-
Saharan Africa dummy (-). All the variables have the right signs and are significant at 
conventional levels, and the R-squared is a high 0.60. Thus, the urban bias theory of   8 
underdevelopment has significant empirical support. Moreover, the deep institutional 
causes of urban biases provide a plausible explanation of the remarkable persistence 
of such biases. We now ask the question of whether the dominant paradigms in 
economic thought satisfactorily recognize and address these biases. 
 
Table 1. A measure of urban biases: descriptive statistics and selected country scores  
Low  Moderately Low  Moderately High  High 
Iran   15.0  Vietnam  30.5  Cameroon  42.5  Ethiopia  66.0 
Venezuela  15.0  Syria  30.0  Brazil  40.5  PNG  56.0 
Pakistan  13.5  Sri Lanka  28.5  Tanzania  40.5  Madagascar  54.0 
Honduras  12.5  Zimbabwe  28.5  Ghana  39.0  Kenya  53.0 
Algeria  12.0  S. Korea  26.0  Morocco  39.0  Malawi  49.0 
Philippines  11.5  S. Africa  26.0  Nigeria  37.5  Iraq  48.0 
Thailand  11.5  Indonesia  25.5  Bolivia  37.5  Chile  45.0 
Costa Rica  7.0  Argentina  24.0  Saudi Arabia  36.0     
Uruguay  5.0  Myanmar  23.0  Peru  35.5     
Bangladesh  4.0  Colombia  21.5  Tunisia  35.5     
Egypt  4.0  India  21.5  Paraguay  34.0     
Turkey  3.0  Ecuador  19.5  China  33.5     
Malaysia  0.0  Nepal  18.0  Mexico  32.0     
 
Notes: The urban bias proxy is the percentage of the urban population with access to safe water less the 
equivalent rural percentage. The source of both variables is the WDI.  
 
Table 2. Explaining an urban bias proxy (circa 2000) for 40 LDCs with Least Squares  
Variable  b 
   
Labour Productivity, 1970  -2.41*** 
   
Land Area  6.96** 
   
Democracy (1-10)  -2.56*** 
   
Land inequality  0.66*** 
   
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy  10.59** 
   
R-squared  0.59 
Adjusted R-squared  0.53 
Notes: White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent 
Standard Errors & Covariance 
 
*The urban bias proxy is the proportion of the urban population with access to safe water less the 
equivalent rural proportion, circa 2000. The source of both variables is the WDI. 
   9 
5.  Understanding the Paradox: Shifting Paradigms 
Whilst biases against agriculture within LDC governments are understandable in light 
of their deep institutional determinants, these alone cannot fully account for the bias 
against agriculture, especially within the  international  foreign aid community. The 
bias in aid delivery and in international policy circles in general should be regarded as 
especially paradoxical given that, in the development paradigm loosely known as the 
‘Washington Consensus’  (Williamson, 1990), intervention in favour of industry at the 
expense of agriculture was deemed especially deleterious to LDC growth prospects, 
especially  in the paradigm’s nascency (Little et al., 1970; Krueger et al., 1991). 
However, the neoclassical public choice-theoretic criticisms of government 
interference in general meant that although the Washington Consensus called for the 
reduction of effective taxes on agriculture, it also reduced government support for 
agriculture. Indeed, Anne Krueger’s work embodies both of these elements (Krueger, 
1974; Krueger et al., 1991).  While it is not our contention that government 
intervention in agriculture has been uniformly successful, the drastic reduction in 
agricultural investment in LDCs, under the auspices of the dominant paradigm of the 
day, was tantamount to throwing away the baby with the bath water. That is, the 
important role of public investment in agricultural development was subsumed under 
anti-government  dogma, despite substantial  evidence in East Asia  of  the 
complementary role of public investment to their likewise favourable trade regimes. 
There are two types of support for our criticisms of the Washington 
Consensus. First, we would need to show that  market-oriented reforms 
(‘liberalization’) in LDCs coincide with reductions in agricultural expenditure. The 
full analysis of this question is available in Bezemer and Headey (2006), which we 
omit here for brevity’s sake. Our approach was to study  agricultural expenditure   10 
trends in nine countries which are argued to have engaged in discrete Washington 
Consensus Style reforms as defined by Sachs and Warner’s (1995) index. In all nine 
countries, agricultural expenditure decreased after reform. However, the net benefits 
of reform appeared to be quite varied. In Mexico and three South American countries 
(Chile, Bolivia and Peru) labor productivity in agriculture increased after reform, so 
that the net benefits of reform appear to have been positive.
4 However due to high 
inequality and weak linkages in South America, there are arguably no clear benefits to 
broader  growth and poverty reduction from agricultural productivity gains in the 
region (e.g., Bravo-Ortega and Lederman, 2005). In the other five countries in the 
sample, reform did not alter the stagnating or declining growth paths of these 
countries. Thus, Washington Consensus reforms in agriculture in this sample appear 
to have brought, at best, sectoral productivity improvements without broader growth 
benefits, or at worst, neither pro-growth nor pro-poor impacts.  
A second strand of evidence that might support a hypothesis of diminished 
emphasis on agriculture in the Washington Consensus is the quantity of intellectual 
resources devoted to agriculture. To test whether such a decline exists, we compared 
research in the World Bank (the more developmental arm of the Consensus) to 
general academic research via systematic word searches of World Bank working 
papers, World Bank World Development Reports and four major general academic 
journals on development. In Figure 1, we indeed see a quite dramatic trend of 
decreasing emphasis on agriculture as a subject of World Bank research. In the period 
1994-98, around 14% of World Bank working papers dealt with the agricultural 
                                                   
4 Moreover, Chile can not really be regarded as a Washington Consensus ‘star student’ as its policy 
reforms were primarily internally driven.   11 
sector, but in the period 2003-2005, this declined to around half that, or 7%.
5 In fact, 
the intellectual resources devoted to agriculture in the World Bank roughly declined 
by about the same proportion as World Bank IDA aid to agriculture over the 1990s, 
which decreased from 19.7% in 1990 to 10.3% in 2000.
6 
 



















Source: The World Bank e-Library  
 
However, this declining trend in the relative intellectual interest in agriculture is not 
apparent in four leading field journals,
7 in which we searched for “agricultur*” or 
“rural” in their abstracts. Figure 1 below depicts the development of the percentages 
for the four journals taken together. We note the start contrast to Figure 2: the share of 
                                                   
5 Although we note that in absolute terms the number of papers on the agricultural sector in 2005 was 
quite high relative to previous years. However, the total numbers of working papers had obviously 
risen proportionately. 
6 In Bezemer and Headey (2006), we also study average “agricultur*” words per page counts of World 
Development Reports from 1978 to 2006 as an additional test of our hypothesis. We once again 
observe a strongly declining trend in the importance of agriculture over this period. The period 1978-
1986 stands out in particular as one in which agriculture received considerable attention in these reports 
(with an average word counts score of 0.51), while the remainder of the period (1987-2006) indicates 
only slight more than a third as much attention (the one exception in this trend being the 2002 
“Building Institutions for Markets” report). 
7 These are World Development, Journal of Development Economics, Journal of Development Studies, 
and Economic Development and Cultural Change.   12 
articles and book entries on ‘green’ topics in the four leading journals nearly doubled 
between 1980 and 2005, from 8% to and 14 %.  
 
Figure 3. The percentages of all book entries and articles on agriculture and rural 
















*The 1980-85 data are for keywords in the title since the search in abstracts does not work for 
this period. Source: ECONLIT 
 
To summarise, we note  declining trends: in agricultural aid in general, 
including World Bank agricultural aid; in most LDC governments’  agricultural 
expenditure, which is often associated with neo-liberal reforms; and finally,  in the 
intellectual resources devoted to agricultural research within what is arguably the 
most important aid donor and development research institution.  In the full version of 
the paper, we also turn our sights to what Rodrik (2003) has termed the Washington 
Consensus Mark II which, along with the Millenium Development Goals, constitutes 
a more rural-based poverty alleviation strategy. While it is still early days in this new 
consensus, our general conclusion is that these related paradigms spread resources 
dangerously thin and still ignore the necessity of agricultural productivity growth for 
both poverty alleviation and successful industrialization.    13 
6.  Conclusion 
This paper has attempted to persuade readers of the inefficient and systematic bias in 
the allocation of developmental resources over the last three decades, with the bias 
running against the agriculture sector in the least developed countries. We have shown 
that a large mass of historical evidence suggests that such a bias is detrimental to 
economic growth and structural transformation, as well as poverty reduction. 
Moreover, the most successful developing economies – as gauged by high rates of 
equitable growth - are those in which the government played a very active role in the 
agricultural sector. Despite this weight of economic theory and historical evidence, 
however, foreign aid and domestic government expenditures to this sector have 
declined remarkably in the last twenty years. 
This persistence of this Agricultural Paradox is ultimately rooted in  deep 
institutional determinants. However, the more  disturbing conclusion in this study is 
that this neglect has not been satisfactorily redressed by the dominant paradigm in our 
profession, the Washington Consensus. If anything, the Consensus has only added to 
the problem. Moreover, candidates to replace this paradigm - a more poverty-focussed 
Washington Consensus approach in tandem with the entirely poverty-focussed 
Millennium Development Goals - still continue, in their very vagueness, to overlook 
the primacy of agricultural development for both economic growth and poverty 
reduction. Instead, this augmented Consensus simply threatens to repeat the mistakes 
of the past, and add to them the novelty of spreading developmental resources 
uncomfortably thin in the years to come. Unfortunately, it is the poor – rural and 
urban – who will ultimately pay the price for this continued neglect. References 
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